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This temporary article checks the publishing workflow for reference 70cd945bc82a. Readable text and standard formatting The check covers formatted text, separate paragraphs and a normal hyperlink. Visit the website home page for its usual content. A reliable publishing process preserves the meaning of an article, its paragraph structure and its links. The public page can then be checked against the original document. This neutral passage is part of a temporary technical check and contains no advertising or external destination. A reliable publishing process preserves the meaning of an article, its paragraph structure and its links. The public page can then be checked against the original document. This neutral passage is part of a temporary technical check and contains no advertising or external destination. A reliable publishing process preserves the meaning of an article, its paragraph structure and its links. The public page can then be checked against the original document. 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A user downloads what appears to be a legitimate cryptocurrency wallet application, opens the installation prompt, and encounters a request for microphone, camera, location, or contact list access. The immediate reaction—instinctive suspicion—is justified. A non-custodial wallet that manages private keys and digital assets has no legitimate reason to capture audio, video, or location data. Understanding which permissions are necessary and which indicate a compromised or fraudulent application is essential before installing any software that will hold financial assets. Bitget Wallet, formerly known as BitKeep, is a non-custodial Web3 wallet supporting over 90 blockchains and available across multiple platforms: Chrome extension, iOS and Android applications, and Windows and Mac desktop clients. The application’s core function is to store private keys locally on a user’s device, enable token swaps through aggregated decentralized exchange liquidity, and provide direct connectivity to blockchain applications. That design has concrete implications for what the wallet actually needs to function and what permissions should trigger immediate concern. What Bitget Wallet actually needs: the essential permissions A non-custodial wallet’s permission footprint should be minimal because its primary work—encryption, signing transactions, and storing keys—happens locally on the device. Bitget Wallet requires only a narrow set of capabilities to function: read access to the device’s file system for storing encrypted wallet data, network connectivity to broadcast transactions and query blockchain state, and access to the device’s hardware if biometric authentication is enabled. Nothing in that list involves recording audio, capturing images, or transmitting location coordinates. The Chrome extension version requires network permissions to communicate with blockchain nodes and decentralized exchanges, along with permission to interact with web pages when a user visits a decentralized application or DEX. This enables the wallet to inject itself into the webpage’s JavaScript environment, a necessary technical requirement for dApp connectivity. The extension does not need camera, microphone, or notification permissions to fulfill these functions, though the browser may display permission warnings based on the extension’s manifest. On mobile platforms, the iOS app requires access to the device’s Keychain—Apple’s secure encrypted storage system—to protect private keys using the Secure Enclave, a dedicated cryptographic processor. For Android, equivalent protection comes through the Android Keystore system. These are legitimate security requirements that prevent even the application developer from accessing unencrypted keys. Bitget Wallet also requests camera permission on mobile to scan QR codes, a practical convenience for entering blockchain addresses quickly rather than typing them manually. That permission is limited to camera frame access during an active scan; it does not enable continuous recording or background monitoring. Biometric authentication—fingerprint or face recognition—is optional but useful for device-level protection. When enabled, biometric sensors authenticate that a user intends to sign a transaction, and the Secure Enclave or Keystore performs the actual cryptographic operation. This creates a two-part defense: the device must be in an unlocked or authenticated state, and the user must explicitly approve each transaction. Biometric permission is legitimate; permission to use the device’s location service, contact list, or call log is not. Red flags: permissions that indicate a fake or compromised wallet If the bitget wallet download or installation prompts request access to microphone, location services, contact list, call history, calendar, photo library without a specific function, or SMS messages, the application is either malicious, a compromised variant, or masquerading under a legitimate name. These permissions serve no legitimate cryptographic or blockchain function. A microphone request in a wallet app is a strong signal of spyware or surveillance intent. Malware authors sometimes use camera or microphone access to record conversations or monitor the device’s physical environment for information leakage—recordings of the user speaking a recovery phrase or typing a PIN, for example. Location services are sometimes requested by malware to identify where the device is located when accessing financial applications, a behavioral indicator that may be sold or used for targeted attacks. Contact list and call history access allows the application to harvest phone numbers or relationship data, expanding the attack surface beyond the wallet itself. SMS permission enables interception of two-factor authentication codes, which is particularly dangerous if the device also holds the wallet: the attacker gains access to both the private key and the ability to defeat SMS-based account recovery. On desktop platforms, Windows and Mac versions of Bitget Wallet should never request permission to access the microphone, webcam, or screen recording capability. If the installation or system prompts ask for these, the user should cancel the installation and verify the download source. Legitimate desktop wallets may request file system access to create a wallet directory, network access to communicate with blockchain nodes, and notification permission to alert the user about transactions. Anything beyond that should be treated as a warning sign. The countermeasure is straightforward: download Bitget Wallet only from official sources—the Chrome Web Store for the extension, the Apple App Store or Google Play for mobile apps, and the official Bitget website for desktop versions. If a download location is unclear or the source is redirected through a third-party download service, do not proceed. Many malware variants are distributed through copycat websites, repackaged builds, or phishing links that appear legitimate at first glance. Verifying the download source before running the installer is more important than reviewing permissions after the application is already running. How private key security depends on minimal permissions The security model of a non-custodial wallet relies on keeping the private key isolated from unnecessary code paths and network connections. Each permission granted to an application expands the potential attack surface. If Bitget Wallet requests microphone access, the application bundles code to record audio; that code could contain vulnerabilities, be compromised through a supply chain attack, or provide an additional channel for exfiltrating sensitive data. Even if the microphone permission is not actively malicious, it represents unnecessary exposure. Local encryption of the private key is the foundational layer of private key security. The key itself is encrypted using a password or PIN that only the user knows; the wallet never stores the plaintext key in memory longer than necessary for

A trader connects a wallet to what appears to be Uniswap, approves a token swap, and the transaction goes through. Days later, the purchased tokens prove worthless, or worse, the wallet is drained. The interface looked correct, the token names matched, and there was no obvious warning. Yet the trader was never interacting with Uniswap’s official smart contracts. Instead, they were using a fork—a cloned version of the protocol that mimics the interface but runs on a different set of contracts controlled by unknown parties. This scenario has cost users millions in stolen funds and serves as a reminder that in decentralized finance, the legitimacy of the underlying smart contract matters more than the appearance of the interface. Uniswap itself is an open-source decentralized exchange protocol where users retain self custody of their assets and trade directly through automated market maker smart contracts without intermediaries or KYC verification. The protocol’s strength lies in its transparent code and audited factory contracts, which create and manage liquidity pools across Ethereum and multiple Layer 2 networks. Yet that same open-source nature—the code is publicly available for anyone to study and deploy—has enabled malicious actors to create convincing replicas. Understanding the difference between official Uniswap factory contracts and unauthorized forks is essential for safe trading, and it requires knowing where to look, what to verify, and how to confirm that a swap is happening on the legitimate protocol. How Uniswap’s factory contracts work and why they matter Uniswap operates through a factory contract—a smart contract that creates and manages liquidity pools for token pairs. When a user or liquidity provider initiates a trade or deposit, they interact with a pool contract deployed by the official factory. The factory’s role is to ensure that pools are created consistently, follow the same logic, and operate according to the protocol’s design. For Uniswap V3, the factory controls concentrated liquidity ranges and fee tier structures; for V4, the architecture becomes even more modular, allowing custom hooks and execution logic. The key security property is that the official factory contract address is fixed and immutable on each blockchain. On Ethereum mainnet, Uniswap V3’s factory is deployed at a specific address that has been audited, tested with billions of dollars in volume, and verified by the community. Layer 2 networks such as Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, and Polygon each have their own official Uniswap factory addresses. This immutability is fundamental: once deployed, the factory contract cannot be changed. Its code is transparent, its behavior is deterministic, and anyone can verify exactly how it creates pools and processes trades. A malicious fork uses a different factory contract address—one controlled by the attacker. Even if the fork’s code is copied from Uniswap’s open-source repository, the factory runs the attacker’s instructions. It may charge hidden fees, route swaps through contracts that steal tokens, or allow the deployer to pause trades and freeze funds. From a user’s perspective, the interface might look identical to the legitimate Uniswap website, but the underlying smart contract risk is total. The transaction is not executed by Uniswap’s audited code; it is executed by whatever code the fork’s deployer has inserted. Official factory addresses across blockchains Uniswap maintains official documentation and verified contract lists for each supported network. On Ethereum mainnet, the Uniswap V3 factory is at address 0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea3113F. This address appears consistently across Etherscan, official Uniswap documentation, and trusted block explorers. Arbitrum has its own V3 factory at 0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea3113F (the same address due to deterministic deployment), while Optimism, Base, Polygon, and other supported chains each have their own official factory addresses. Verifying the factory address is the first and most important security check. When a user connects to a Uniswap interface, they can inspect the browser’s network tab or use a transaction decoder to see which contract is being called. Legitimate trades call the official router or swap aggregator, which then interacts with pools created by the official factory. A fork’s transaction will show a different factory address or router contract. Some forks may even use the name “Uniswap” in their contract comments while running entirely different code underneath. The official Uniswap team regularly publishes verified contract addresses and maintains a smart contract risk assessment framework. Users can cross-reference any address they encounter against these official sources. Block explorers such as Etherscan display verification badges for audited and openly published contracts, which adds another layer of confirmation. If a contract claims to be Uniswap but has no verification badge, appears on no official documentation, or has a deployer address that is unknown, it is almost certainly a fork. Why open-source code does not guarantee security in practice Uniswap’s open-source design is a strength for transparency and decentralized governance. The code is available for anyone to read, audit, and improve. This visibility has led to significant security discoveries and optimizations by independent researchers. However, open-source code is not a guarantee of safety when deployed by unknown actors. The distinction is crucial: the code quality and the code deployment are separate questions. Official Uniswap code running on the official factory is secure because it has been audited, tested, and deployed by the protocol’s core team with the community’s oversight. The same code running on a fork’s factory is only as trustworthy as the fork’s deployer. Attackers exploit this confusion by copying Uniswap’s legitimate code, deploying it to their own factory contract, and then inserting malicious additions such as fee extraction, token theft, or account lockups. The fork may start as a perfect clone, gradually modified to serve the attacker’s interests. To a casual user, the experience is indistinguishable: tokens are deposited, a swap is executed, and the transaction appears to succeed. But the tokens are routed through the attacker’s contracts, which collect them before they reach the intended destination. A defi protocol’s security is not measured by the code alone but by the combination of code, deployment, governance, and community oversight. Uniswap has community governance through the UNI token, allowing token holders to propose and vote on changes to the

A DAO treasury holds Ethereum, USDC, and several high-value NFTs. A protocol maintains reserves across multiple EVM chains. An institutional custodian needs to secure assets without concentrating control in a single key or person. Each scenario requires an asset management system that can simultaneously handle native cryptocurrency, fungible tokens, and non-fungible assets while enforcing approval requirements that multiple signers must satisfy. Safe Wallet, formerly known as Gnosis Safe, provides that capability through a smart contract wallet architecture specifically designed to support diverse asset types and collaborative transaction governance. Unlike custodial exchanges or single-key wallets, an NFT wallet built on Safe’s infrastructure does not depend on a company’s infrastructure or a single private key. Instead, it operates as a multisignature smart contract deployed on the Ethereum blockchain or compatible networks. The contract itself holds assets, executes transfers, and enforces rules about who can approve transactions and under what conditions. That technical distinction fundamentally changes how tokens, NFTs, and native currency can be managed together, what risks emerge, and why organizations at scale prefer collaborative custody over individual key management. Smart contract wallet architecture and why it differs from key-based wallets Traditional wallets store private keys and sign transactions directly. A single compromised key exposes all assets under that key’s control. A smart contract wallet inverts this model. The wallet is a deployed contract on the blockchain that holds assets in its own address. Users do not hold private keys to that address; instead, they control separate signer accounts that can propose, approve, and execute transactions from the contract. This separation is particularly important for an NFT wallet or token management system where multiple parties must collaborate. Safe’s architecture uses the contract’s internal storage to track balances, ownership, and transaction state. When a user proposes a transaction—such as sending an ERC-20 token or transferring an NFT—the contract records that proposal with relevant details: recipient, amount or token ID, data payload, and execution requirements. Other signers can review the proposal on-chain, verify its correctness, and add their approval signatures. Once the threshold of required signatures is met, anyone can execute the transaction by submitting all collected approvals to the contract. The contract then verifies that the approvers are authorized, the threshold is satisfied, and the transaction data is unchanged before executing the transfer. This design has immediate consequences. First, asset custody is determined by contract logic, not by a provider’s database or a single key holder’s security practices. The assets remain in the contract’s address indefinitely, and no update to the Safe application or provider can change that fact. Second, transaction history and approvals are recorded on-chain and remain auditable forever. A DAO or institution using Safe cannot later claim that a transfer was unauthorized if the contract logs show the correct signatures and threshold. Third, smart contract code defines the rules; if the contract accepts a transfer, it is final. That irreversibility is crucial. When an NFT is transferred out of a Safe contract, the new owner can verify from the blockchain that the transfer occurred correctly and was signed by the required approvers. There is no intermediate platform or company that can reverse it, freeze it, or reverse roles. For organizations managing significant assets, that finality and on-chain auditability make a smart contract wallet fundamentally different from a custodial service or a single-key wallet backed by a company’s promises. Native Ethereum and managing multiple asset types in a single contract A Safe contract can hold Ethereum directly at its address, just as any account can. When a transaction proposes to send ETH, the contract’s executeTransaction function transfers the specified amount to the recipient. The approval process is identical to token transfers: signers must reach the configured threshold before execution. The difference from a traditional wallet is visibility. The contract’s balance and outgoing ETH transfers are recorded on-chain, available to all participants and auditors without relying on a private key holder’s records. ERC-20 tokens introduce an important distinction. The Safe contract itself cannot independently move ERC-20 tokens stored at its address. Instead, it must call the token’s transfer function. This requires encoding the appropriate function call as transaction data. When the contract executes the transaction, it invokes the token’s contract with the parameters encoded in the proposal. The token contract then checks that the caller (the Safe contract) has a sufficient balance or allowance and completes the transfer. This indirection may seem unnecessary, but it is the standard mechanism by which any smart contract interacts with tokens. Native cryptocurrency and ERC-20 tokens therefore require the Safe contract to handle two different execution paths. ETH transfers are internal balance adjustments. Token transfers require external function calls. Both are specified in a single transaction proposal, both require the same approval threshold, and both result in on-chain records. An institutional Ethereum wallet using Safe to manage reserves can therefore hold a mix of ETH, stablecoins like USDC, governance tokens, and other ERC-20 assets in a single contract, with unified approval workflows and shared role-based access control. That consolidation matters for operational simplicity. Instead of maintaining separate addresses for different asset types, or deploying multiple wallets with different approval rules, an organization can create one Safe contract with configured signers and thresholds. Every outgoing transaction, regardless of asset type, follows the same approval process. Accounting and audit trails remain unified. The contract address is stable and publicly known, making it easier for token issuers, protocol developers, or stakeholders to verify where treasury assets are held. NFT management and ERC-721 and ERC-1155 token handling NFT support in Safe applies the same contract-mediated execution model. ERC-721 tokens are unique assets with individual token IDs. ERC-1155 tokens can represent both unique and fungible items within a single contract. Neither requires special handling by Safe; the contract executes the appropriate transfer function call based on the transaction data provided by the proposer. When an NFT is stored at a Safe contract’s address, the contract is recognized as the owner of that token. A proposal to transfer the NFT to